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EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS
GROWTH RATE OF HUMAN CAPITAL
Wansheng Tang, Chi Zhou, Chaoqun Xiao and Ruiqing Zhao
This article studies an equilibrium search problem when jobs provided by firms can be
either unskilled or skilled and when workers differing in their education level can be either
low-educated or high-educated. The structure proportion of jobs affects the equilibrium which
indicates a threshold that can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separating or cross-skill.
In addition, the cross-skill equilibrium solution implies the high-educated workers are more
likely to obtain higher pay rates than the low-educated workers with same tenure. Moreover,
the profits of the firms decrease as the number of the low-educated workers increases. The most
interesting conclusion is that the growth rate of the human capital is an endogenous variable
which is different from previous work.
Keywords: dynamic programming, contracts, job search, market equilibrium, human cap-
ital
Classification: 49L20, 90C39, 91B40, 97M40
1. INTRODUCTION
The unsymmetrical distribution between job opportunities and labor resources makes
the real labor market different from other markets. In the labor market, workers hope to
find an ideal job in the shortest time, while firms expect to maximize their profit through
offering workers the wage as low as possible. In practice, the human capital of workers
not only affects the efficiency of job search and matching, but also becomes the most
important influencing factors of corporate value. Among 11,601 construction enterprises
in Taiwan in 2008, 8017 (i. e., 69%) of them are small construction enterprises. And only
a few of the construction workers employed had bachelor’s degree, while many of them
have only received junior high school education or even lower education, resulting in low
safety awareness and inability to increase profits [9]. Therefore, both human capital and
labor market structure, which have a close relation, have significant effects on job search
and recruitment strategies.
Job search theory developed in the 1960s has been an important theory in the la-
bor market which is the study of dynamic decision making problems involving decision
makers’ optimal search strategy under incomplete information. Since the pioneering
research of Stigler [24, 25], many researchers have done tremendously significant works
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in the search theory. McCall [17, 18] developed a sequential search model to analyze the
job search behaviors of the new entrants. Phelps et al. [20] who is the first one to propose
the concept of job search theory assumed that firms offer diverse wages and each worker
learns about the distribution of wages from her search outcomes. Eriksson et al. [11]
studied gender differences in job search. Zhou et al. [26, 27] investigated a search model
to study job search and recruitment problem. Their results have a certain practical sig-
nificance. Recently, job search models relax the assumptions of the canonical model by
allowing for heterogeneous workers, an endogenous wage distribution, on-the-job search
and unsteady-state conditions, to have better explanations for the search behaviors of
workers, the process of the firms offering wage, and the phenomenon of job creation and
job destruction in the labor market.
Over the past few decades, there has been a number of significant developments in
the study of labor market equilibrium. Maybe the most commonly used equilibrium
search models are on the basis of the work of Burdett and Mortensen [6] (for simplicity
B/M). B/M assumed that each firm posts a single wage, both employed and unemployed
workers can search for better job opportunities. Having recognized that, Burdett and
Coles [2] (for simplicity B/C) and Stevens [22] extended B/M by assuming that firms
post wage-tenure contract rather than a single wage. Burdett and Coles [4] generalized
previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Carrillo-Tudela [7] made
an important assumption that firms cannot decide their wage offers on unemployment
and employment duration. Shi [23] analyzed the equilibrium in a labor market in which
firms offer wage-tenure contracts to direct the search by risk-averse workers. This paper
differs from the aforementioned papers in the aspects of contract form that the firms
offer wage-human capital contracts in order to analyze the effects of human capital
accumulation on the labor market equilibrium.
Recent years, a number of theses have combined human capital accumulation with the
B/M as studied here. For instance, Rubinstein and Weiss [21] analyzed the accumulation
of human capital and on-the-job search, however, not considering market equilibrium.
Dolado et al. [10] examined the effects of transitory skill mismatches in a matching
model with heterogeneous jobs and workers. Gonzalez and Shi [14] integrated learning
from search into an equilibrium framework and applied lattice-theoretic techniques to
analyze learning from experience. In an insightful study, Burdett and Coles [3] assumed
that workers accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing, and they
found the equilibrium approach to identify the effects between experience and tenure on
workers’ wages. Bringing in training, Fu [13] yielded new insights on wage dispersion
and wage dynamics which shows that endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation
between work experience and human capital.
The model addressed in this thesis is studied based on the previous research. For
instance, Burdett et al. [5] structured an equilibrium labor market by allowing workers
to learn by doing. Their paper implied that learning-by-doing increases equilibrium
wage dispersion and considered that all firms are equally productive, and workers are
heterogeneous defined by initial productivity. In contrast to the previous discussion, we
discuss an equilibrium search model in which firms offer unskilled jobs or skilled jobs
with different distributions and workers with low-education or high-education search for
better job opportunities. The introduction of heterogeneous firms refines the structure
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of the labor market which has important consequences for the optimal search profits.
High-educated workers are assumed to accept unskilled jobs for which they are over-
qualified. The structure proportion of jobs affects the equilibrium which shows there
is a threshold that can distinguish whether there exists a separating equilibrium or
a cross-skill equilibrium. In addition, the cross-skill equilibrium solution implies that
the high-educated workers are more likely to own higher pay rates than that the low-
educated workers with the same tenure are likely to. It also implies both the profits of
offering the unskilled jobs and offering skilled jobs decrease with the increasing number
of the low-educated workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs
is greater than the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs until there is only
very few high-educated workers. Another important difference is that we allow for the
growth rate of an employed worker’s human capital to be an endogenous variable. Unlike
other papers such as [3, 5] and [13] in which the growth rate of an employed worker’s
productivity is given exogenously, this allows us to clarify the endogenous growth rate
of human capital which can be determined by death shock, job destruction shock, the
fraction of the unskilled jobs and the arrival rate of jobs.
This paper shows how the endogenous human capital affects the labor market equilib-
rium. Firstly, this paper discusses an equilibrium search problem in which jobs provided
by firms can be either unskilled or skilled while workers differing in their education
level can be either low-educated or high-educated. The high-educated workers are as-
sumed to be able to accept either the unskilled jobs or the skilled jobs for which they
are over-qualified, while the low-educated workers can only accept the unskilled jobs.
There is little literature to deal with this problem. Secondly, we imply that the struc-
ture proportion of the offered jobs affects the equilibrium which shows there exists a
threshold that can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separating or cross-skill. In
addition, the cross-skill equilibrium solution implies that the high-educated workers are
more likely to own higher pay rates than that the low-educated workers with the same
tenure are likely to. Thirdly, it also yields a new insight into the effect of the structure
proportion of workers on the profits which implies that both the profits of firms offering
the unskilled jobs and offering the skilled jobs decrease with the increasing number of
the low-educated workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is
greater than the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs until there is only very few
high-educated workers. Fourthly, the growth rate of the human capital is an endogenous
variable which is different from previous work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a framework de-
scribing the workers’ job search strategies with different education levels and the firms’
optimal contracts. Section 3 gives a definition of market equilibrium and illustrates the
distributions of pay rate in different types of jobs. Section 4 presents the effect of hu-
man capital accumulation on equilibrium pay rate. Using numerical example, Section 5
describes how the proportion of the low-educated workers affects profit and the support
of the pay rate. The paper is concluded in Section 6 with further work pointed out.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a labor market in steady state in which time is discrete. There is a continuum
of risk neutral workers (worker is denoted by ‘she’) and firms (firm is denoted by ‘he’),
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each of measure one.
The workers differ in their education level j who can be either low-educated (j = 0) or
high-educated (j = 1). An exogenous fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the workers is low-educated,
while the remaining fraction 1 − α is high-educated. After a low-educated worker has
worked for τ periods up to period t, her human capital is denoted by ht = (1 + g)τ ,
where 0 < g < 1, and the variable τ is the worker’s experience and closely related
to the period t. While for a high-educated worker, her human capital is denoted by
ht = egτ [5, 13]. For each new entrant, τ = 0 and ht = 1. The lives of workers are of
uncertain duration. Any worker dies with probability δ per period, which describes the
inflow rate of new entrants per period. All the dead workers are replaced with newly
joined workers, so the population is balanced. There are job destruction shocks in which
each employed worker is displaced into unemployment with probability σ per period.
However, the human capital of the unemployed worker does not grow. Assume that
there is no recall if a worker quits or rejects a job offer. The objective of the worker is
to maximize her total expected lifetime utility.
Jobs are either unskilled or skilled. A fraction β of all the jobs in the labor market
which can be performed by both types of workers are called unskilled jobs; while 1− β
of all the jobs which only requires high-educated workers are called skilled jobs. Any
firm generates revenue p from each unit of human capital he employs. Each firm posts
a job offer contract θi at zero cost in the period t. That is, θi is the wage per unit of
human capital and i specifies the type of jobs, which can be either unskilled jobs (i = 0)
or skilled jobs (i = 1). Let F0(θ0) describe the probability of receiving an unskilled job
offer which is no greater than θ0. Likewise, F1(θ1) describes the probability of receiving
a skilled job offer which is no greater than θ1. Further, let θi and θ
i
denote the infimum
and supremum of the support of Fi. Let λ denote the Poisson arrival rate of these offers.
Low-educated workers meet these offers at the same rate as high-educated do, but they
do not qualify for the skilled jobs. The effective arrival rate of unskilled job offers faced
by any low-educated worker is βλ, independent of their employment status; while for
high-educated workers, the effective arrival rate depends on the type of jobs. If a job
is from unskilled jobs, the arrival rate is βλ; if it is from skilled jobs, the arrival rate is
(1− β)λ. For simplicity, we assume that firms only offer one type of job and the choice
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Fig. 1. The timeline of events.
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Figure 1 explicitly presents the timeline of events. Assume workers and firms meet
randomly. For a low-educated worker with human capital ht, she will meet an outside
firm which offers unskilled job contract θ0 with probability βλ. If the match succeeds,




ht at the production stage.
Meanwhile for a high-educated worker with human capital ht, it depends on the type
of the outside job. With probability βλ the worker will meet an unskilled job offer θ0.




ht at the production stage.
With probability (1 − β)λ the worker will meet a skilled job offer θ1. If the match




ht. If the match does
not succeed, the worker returns to her previous status. In this situation, the outside
firm doesn’t have any profit. For an unemployed worker, she has income bht, where b
can be interpreted as home production or leisure, and 0 < b < p.
2.1. The worker’s problem
When a job offer arrives, a worker must choose between keeping the current status and
accepting an outside offer. Let xt be the worker’s decision variable which can be either
0 or 1. Furthermore, xt = 0 means that the worker will keep the current status, while
xt = 1 means that the worker will accept the new offer.
2.1.1. Low-educated workers’ job search strategies
In this subsection, the search behavior of only low-educated workers is considered. The






u (θt, ht, xt) ,
where θt, ht are the state variables in period t.









i. e., θt+1 also represents the payment per unit of human capital in period t + 1. We
assume that ξ is a random variable denoting whether a low-educated worker survives at
that period, which Pr{ξ = 0} = δ represents the worker dies and Pr{ξ = 1} = 1 − δ
represents the worker is still in the labor market. And ζ is also a random variable,
denoting whether a low-educated worker receives an unskilled job with Pr{ζ = 1} = βλ
or Pr{ζ = 0} = 1 − βλ. The expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with
the human capital ht is denoted by Vu0(ht). When an unemployed worker with low-
education meets an outside job offer θ0, she would compare the expected lifetime utility
of accepting the offer, denoted by V0(θ0;ht), with that of unemployment Vu0(ht). If the
worker chooses V0(θ0;ht), she would accept a new offer θ0. Otherwise, she still keeps
the current status. Therefore, the Bellman equation is formulated as follows,
Vu0(ht) = max{bht + E(θ0)V0(θt+1;ht+1)},
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which can be rewritten as
Vu0(ht) = bht + (1− δ − βλ)Vu0(ht) + βλE(θ0) max{Vu0(ht), V0(θ0;ht)}+ δ · 0
= bht + (1− δ − βλ)Vu0(ht) + βλE(θ0) max{Vu0(ht), V0(θ0;ht)}.
(1)
Next consider the employed workers with low-education. Different from the unem-
ployed workers, there is a job destruction shock for the employed workers with low-





(1− ζ)θt + ζ
(
(1− xt)θt + xtθ0
)]}
,
where η is a random variable denoting whether there exists a job destruction shock.
Pr{η = 0} = σ means the worker is displaced into unemployment and Pr{η = 1} = 1−σ
means that there is no job destruction shock, and independent of ξ and ζ. Let V0(θt;ht)
denote the expected lifetime utility of a worker when she is employed by obtaining pay
rate θt in period t and her human capital is ht. Give an employed worker with human
capital ht as an example, she needs to choose the larger one between V0(θt;ht+1) and
V0(θ0;ht+1). In addition, her human capital ht will become (1 + g)ht at next period.
Therefore, the Bellman equation is formulated as follows,
V0(θt;ht) = max{θtht + E(θ0)V0(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be written as
V0(θt;ht)= θtht + σVu0((1 + g)ht) + (1− δ − σ − βλ)V0(θt; (1 + g)ht)
+βλE(θ0) max{V0(θt; (1 + g)ht), V0(θ0; (1 + g)ht)}.
(2)
The employed worker has a job from which she gets payment θt per unit of human
capital in period t, which corresponds to the first term on the right-hand side in Eq.(2).
With probability σ, the worker is displaced into unemployment by a job destruction
shock, which is the second term on the right-hand side in Eq.(2). The third term on the
right-hand side in Eq.(2) implies that the worker keeps with the current firm if she does
not receive any offer. At next period the worker gets a new offer with probability βλ,
upon which she chooses whether to stay with the current job or to accept the new job,
which is the last term on the right-hand side in Eq.(2).
Once she is displaced into unemployment, dies or receives an outside offer which is
higher than her current pay rate, the employed worker with low-education will leave
the firm. Hence, the separate probability of the employed worker with low-education by
obtaining θt is described as follows.
ψ0(θt) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θt)),
where F0(θt) represents the probability of receiving an outside job offer which is no
greater than the current pay rate θt.
Employed workers would stop the search and accept any outsider offer which is higher
than her current pay rate; while for unemployed worker, they would stop the search and
accept any outsider offer which is no less than the reservation pay rate. By adopting
the optimal stopping rule [19], we obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.1. For the unemployed workers with low-education, the reservation pay
rate, denoted by θ0r , can be characterized by the following equation






1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))
dθ. (3)
Moreover, the optimal job search implies that any unemployed worker with low-education
accepts job offer θ0 if and only if θ0 ≥ θ0r .
Proposition 2.1 implies that any unemployed worker with low-education accepts job
offer when the offer is higher than the reservation pay rate. We assume that jobs provided
by firms can be either unskilled or skilled and that workers differing in their education
level can be either low-educated or high-educated. The human capital accumulation
causes that the reservation pay rate is related to the human capital.
Proposition 2.2. The growth rate of human capital g is an endogenous variable which
is increasing with the death shock δ and the job destruction shock σ, while decreasing
with the fraction of the unskilled jobs β and the arrival rate of jobs λ.
Faced with the high death rate or the staff reduction in large, workers normally raise
the growth rate of the human capital actively which increases production indirectly in
order to continue to be employed. That is why the rise of the death shock or the job
destruction shock results in the growth rate of the human capital increases. If there are
more unskilled jobs in the labor market, resulting in demotivation, the growth rate of
the human capital reduces. When the situation of employment is better, such as the
arrival rate of the jobs is higher, the workers obviously have less competition which leads
the growth rate of the human capital to become slower.
Proposition 2.3. The reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with low-education
θ0r which satisfies Eq.(3) is unique.
Obviously, the term on the left-hand side of Eq.(3) is linear in θ0r with slope − δg , and
the straight line intercepts the x-axis at θr0 = b(1 + g). The terms on the right-hand









that means the straight line is tangent to the curve at θ0r . It is clear that the terms on
the right-hand side are positive strictly. Therefore, the straight line and the curve must




2.1.2. High-educated workers’ job search strategies
For the high-educated workers, they can receive both the unskilled jobs and the skilled






u (θt, ht, xt) ,
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Fig. 2. Reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with
low-education.
where θt and ht are the state variables in period t.








(1− z)(θ0 + c) + zθ1
)]}
,
where ξ, η, ζ, y and z are all independent random variables. ξ, η and ζ are described
as the same as the above section, y denotes whether the unemployed worker with high-
education receives an outsider offer or not. Pr{y = 0} = 1 − λ means that the worker
does not receive any outside job and Pr{y = 1} = λ means that the worker receives an
outside offer, and z represents the kind of the outside offer received with Pr{z = 0} = βλ
and Pr{z = 1} = (1−β)λ, which means the offer is from unskilled jobs and skilled jobs.
In addition, the human capital of the unemployed worker does not grow. The Bellman
equation is written as follows.
Vu1(ht) = max{bht + E(θ0)V1(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be rewritten as
Vu1(ht)= bht + (1− δ − λ)Vu1(ht) + βλE(θ0) max{Vu1(ht), V1(θ0;ht)}
+(1− β)λE(θ1) max{Vu1(ht), V1(θ1;ht)}.
(4)






(1− y)θt + y
(
(1− xt)θt + xt
(
(1− z)θ0 + zθ1
))]}
.
Given an employed worker with the human capital ht and the pay rate θt at period t,
the Bellman equation is also formulated as
V1(θt;ht) = max{θtht + E(θ1)V1(θt+1;ht+1)},
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which can be rewritten as
V1(θt;ht) = θtht + σVu1(eght) + (1− δ − σ − λ)V1(θt; eght)
+βλE(θ0) max{V1(θt; eght), V1(θ0 + c; eght)}
+(1− β)λE(θ1) max{V1(θt; eght), V1(θ1; eght)}.
(5)
Given the pay rate θt, the employed worker leaves a firm at the rate
ψ1(θt) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θt)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θt)),
which is the separation rate of an employed worker with high-education. Similarly, the
employed worker with high-education accepts any outsider offer which is higher than her
current pay rate, while the unemployed worker with high-education accepts any outsider
offer which is no less than the reservation pay rate described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. For the unemployed workers with high-education, the reservation pay














(1− β) (1− F1(θ))




Furthermore, the optimal job search implies that an unemployed worker with high-
education accepts job offer θ1 if and only if θ1 ≥ θ1r .
Proposition 2.5. When the fraction of the unskilled jobs is greater than β, there exists
a cross-skill equilibrium that the high-educated workers choose either the unskilled job
or the skilled job; when the fraction of the unskilled jobs is no greater than β, there
exists a separating equilibrium that the high-educated workers only choose the skilled
jobs, where β satisfies
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)




(1− δ)[(1− β)λ+ δ]− δσ
.
Proposition 2.6. The reservation pay rate of the unemployed workers with high-
education θ1r which satisfies Eq.(6) is unique.
Obviously, the term on the left-hand side of Eq.(6) is linear in θ1r with slope −
δ
eg − 1
and the straight line intercepts the x-axis at θr1 = e
gb. The terms on the right-hand









which means the straight line is tangent to the curve at θ1r . It is clear that the terms
on the right-hand side are positive strictly. Therefore, the straight and the curve must
have a unique intersection at some θ1r < e
gb described in Figure 3 which shows that θ1r
is unique.
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Fig. 3. Reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with
high-education.
2.2. The firm’s problem
The firm’s optimization problem can be reduced to choosing an optimal pay rate to
maximize the steady state profit. Let Nj(h) denote the probability of the unemployed
workers of type j whose human capital is h, Gj(θ, h) denote the probability of employed
workers with human capital h and pay rate θ, and γj denote the unemployment rate of
the workers with type j, j = 0, 1.
For a firm offering unskilled job contract θ0 to the low-educated workers with human





N0 ((1 + g)τ )
∞∑
s=0





























Therefore, the steady state flow profit equals the hiring rate of the firm, multiplied by the
expected profit of each hire. The first term in the above equation is the flow profit due
to attracting unemployed workers with low-education whose human capital is (1 + g)τ ,
where τ is the experience. The second term is the flow profit due to attracting employed
workers with low-education whose human capital is (1 + g)τ and her current pay rate is
no greater than θ0.
If the firm offers unskilled job contract θ0 to the high-educated workers with human
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The firm offering unskilled jobs can attract both types of workers, thus the optimization







































If a firm offers a skilled job contract θ1 to the high-educated workers with human capital
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The firm offering skilled jobs only attracts high-educated workers, then the optimization




























Note that the objective of each firm is to maximize the steady state flow profit, that is,
the unskilled firms choose θ0 to maximize π0 = π00 + π01, while the skilled firms choose
θ1 to maximize π1 = π11.
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we formally characterize a market equilibrium, and then solve the un-
employment rate γj , distribution functions Nj(·) and Gj(·), where j = 0, 1.
Definition 3.1. A market equilibrium is a set {θ0r , θ1r , γ0, γ1, N0(·), N1(·), G0(·),
G1(·), F0(·), F1(·)} that satisfies the following requirements:
1) θ0r is the optimal reservation pay rate per unit of human capital of any unemployed
low-educated worker, and θ1r is the optimal reservation pay rate of any unemployed
high-educated worker, given in Propositions 2.1 and 2.4, respectively;
2) γ0, N0(·), G0(·) are consistent with the steady state turnover and pay rate distribu-
tion F0(·); likewise, γ1, N1(·), G1(·) are consistent with steady state turnover and
pay rate distributions F0(·) and F1(·);
3) the constant profit conditions are satisfied, i. e.,
π00 + π01 = π∗0 > 0, for all θ
0 where dF0(θ0) > 0,
π00 + π01 ≤ π∗0 , for all θ0 where dF0(θ0) = 0,
π11 = π∗1 > 0, for all θ
1 where dF0(θ1) > 0 or dF1(θ1) > 0,
π11 ≤ π∗1 , for all θ1 where dF0(θ1) = 0 and dF1(θ1) = 0,
where π∗0 is the total optimal profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs and
π∗1 is the total optimal profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs in a equilibrium
market. The constant profit conditions imply that all equilibrium offers of the
same type i enjoy the same profit π∗i with the workers’ optimal strategy.
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In Subsection 3.1, we first use the steady state turnover arguments to solve for γj ,
j = 0, 1. And then in Subsection 3.2, we determine the distribution functions Nj(·) and
Gj(·). Last, we find Fi in Subsection 3.3 so that the above constant profit conditions
are satisfied, i = 0, 1.
3.1. Solve γ0, N0(·) and G0(·) for the low-educated workers
To solve γ0, this subsection first considers the steady state turnover in the pool of
unemployed workers whose number is γ0α. The total outflow from this pool is (βλ +
δ)γ0α, which either finds a job or leaves the market. While the inflow in the pool is
composed of the new entrants and the employed workers who are displaced into the
unemployment, which is δα + σ(1 − γ0)α. Equating the outflow with the inflow, the
equilibrium unemployment rate of the low-educated workers is
γ0 =
σ + δ
δ + σ + βλ
. (12)
To solve N0(h), we next consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the un-
employed workers with human capital h. When h = 1, the outflow (βλ + δ)γ0αN0(1)
consists of the workers who either find an unskilled job or leave the market. And the
inflow is composed only of the new entrants which is δα, as the human capital of the
workers who are laid off from the employment is at least (1 + g). Setting the outflow





When h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1, the steady-state turnover requires




where the left hand side describes the outflow of the workers with human capital h who
find a new unskilled job or leave the labor market, and the right hand side describes
the inflow of the employed workers with human capital h and current offer θ who are

















G0(θ, h)dθ, if h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1.
To solve G0(θ, h), we finally consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the
employed workers with human capital h, where h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1 and the current pay
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rate θ is no greater than θ0. The workers with human capital h will leave this pool for
sure, regardless of whether they stay or not. (If they stay, their human capital becomes
(1 + g)h. If they are displaced into unemployment or leave the market, their human





The workers with human capital (1 + g)−1h who were employed or unemployed will join
this pool group if they find a job offering pay rate which is no greater than θ0. The












dθ + γ0αN0 (h)βλF0(θ0).















dθ + γ0N0 (h)βλF0(θ0).
(16)






and G0(θ, h) satisfies∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ=
δβλF0(θ0)(βλ+ δ − βλσ)











for all θ0 ∈ [θ0r , θ
0
] and h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=0, where q0 =
(1−δ−σ)(βλ+δ)
βλ(1−σ)+δ < 1.
3.2. Solve γ1, N1(·) and G1(·) for the high-educated workers
In this subsection, the inflow and the outflow of the high-educated workers are similar
to those of the low-educated workers.
To solve γ1, we first consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the unemployed
workers with high-education whose number is γ1(1 − α). Equating the outflow (δ +
λ)γ1(1− α) with the inflow δ(1− α) + σ(1− γ1)(1− α), the equilibrium unemployment
rate of the high-educated workers is
γ1 =
δ + σ
δ + σ + λ
. (17)
880 W. TANG, C. ZHOU, C. XIAO AND R. ZHAO
To solve N1(h), we next consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the unem-






When h ∈ {eng}∞n=1, the steady state turnover requires





















G1(θ, eng)dθ, if h ∈ {eng}∞n=1.
To solve G1(h), we finally consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the
employed workers with human capital h where h ∈ {eng}∞n=1 and the current pay rate θ



















By utilizing the same method like the above subsection to consider the low-educated
workers, we obtain the following proposition.



























for all θ ∈ [θ1r , θ
1
] and h ∈ {eng}∞n=1, where q1 =
(1− δ − σ)(λ+ δ)
λ+ δ − σλ
< 1 and λ̂ = λ+ δ.
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3.3. The distributions F0(θ0) and F1(θ1) of human capital contract
Using Eqs.(48) and (49) to substitute out N0((1 + g)τ ) and
∫ θ0
θ0
G0(θ, (1 + g)τ )dθ in














ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)).
Moreover, substitute N1(egτ ) and
∫ θ0
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ into (8) to get the following formula
π01(θ0) =
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg] (λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− F̂ )(λ+ δ)
]
×
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[








ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
Note that π0(θ0) = π00(θ0) + π01(θ0) for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ
0
]. Based on the constant profit
conditions, we have π0(θ0) = π∗0 for all θ
0 ∈ [θ0, θ0]. To obtain the equilibrium profit for
the firms offering unskilled jobs π∗0 , set θ
0 = θ0, we obtain
π∗0 =
βλ2α2δσ(p− θ0)
[1− (1− δ − σ − βλ)(1 + g)](βλ+ δ)2[1− q0(1 + g)]
+
λ2(1− α)2δσ(p− θ0)
[1− (1− δ − σ − λ)eg](λ+ δ)2(1− q1eg)
.
(24)
To solve for F0(·) and F1(·), we divide [θ0, θ
0
] into two intervals [θ0, θ1] and (θ1, θ
0
].
In interval [θ0, θ1], there are only the unskilled jobs, while in interval (θ1, θ
0
], there are
both the unskilled jobs and the skilled jobs. And then we should determine θ1. Assume
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ψ0(θ1) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ1)),






g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg)
.
As π0(θ1) = π∗0 , we determine θ


























ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)),
and
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + λ− βλF0(θ0).
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Thus we can get the expression for F0(θ0) by Eqs.(24) and (26), where θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ1].






























ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)), F̂ = βF0(θ0)+(1−β)F1(θ0)
and
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).













































) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ
0
)).
Using Eqs.(22) and (23) to substitute out N1(egτ ) and
∫ θ1
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ in Eq.(10),
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where
ψ1(θ1) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ1)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ1)).
Note that π1(θ1) = π11(θ1) for all θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ
1
]. Based on the constant profit conditions,
we have π1(θ1) = π∗1 for all θ
1 ∈ [θ1, θ1]. To obtain the equilibrium profit for the firms


























g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg)
.






λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ(λ+ δ + σ)




) = π∗1 , we can obtain θ
1





], and then we should determine θ
0










































) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ
0
)).









). When θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ0], there exists
π1(θ1)=
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg] (λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− F̂ 1)(λ+ δ)
]
×
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[




(λ+ δ − σλ)(F̂ 1)(1− F̂ 1)
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
 , (31)
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where
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
We obtain the expression for F0(θ1) and F1(θ1) by Eqs.(24), (27), (29) and (31), when


















ψ1(θ1) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ1)).





4. HUMAN CAPITAL AND EQUILIBRIUM PAY RATE
In this section, we first research the effect of the low-educated workers’ human capital on
equilibrium pay rate. Next, we consider the effect of the high-educated workers’ human
capital on the equilibrium pay rate. Similar to the findings of Burdett et al. [5], there
is positive correlation between the human capital of workers and the equilibrium pay
rates. Last, we discuss differences between these two kinds of effects.











, which implies the probability of the low-
educated workers’ pay rate is less than θ0 conditional on human capital h = (1 + g)m.
By Eq.(49), we obtain that∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ=

















σ(1−ψ0(θ0))+(βλ+δ)(1−F0(θ0)) > 0, 1 − F0(θ
0) > 0 and σ(1−δ−σ)βλ+δ−βλσ > 0. Since
0 < 1 − ψ0(θ0) < 1 and 0 < q0 < 1, we can get 1−ψ0(θ
0)
q0
> 0. On the other hand,





(1−δ−σ)(βλ+δ) < 1, therefore, 0 <
1−ψ0(θ0)
q0
< 1. Thus, it
can prove that the conditional probability is decreasing in m. That is to say, a low-
educated worker with higher human capital is more likely to have a higher pay rate.
Specially, when m = 0, Eq.(33) can be written as∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|1)dθ = F0(θ0).
It shows that for the new entrants with low-education, their pay rates are randomly
drawn from F0(θ0). Further, when m→∞,∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|∞)dθ =
σ(1− δ − σ)F0(θ0)






Proposition 4.1. The probability of the low-educated workers’ equilibrium pay rate
which is less than θ0 conditional on human capital h,
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ, is decreasing in h.











G1(θ, h)dθ, which implies the proba-
bility of the high-educated workers’ pay rate is less than θ1 condition on human capital
h. By Eq.(23), we obtain that∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ =
(λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))















σ(1−ψ1(θ1))+(λ+δ)[1−βF0(θ1)−(1−β)F1(θ1)] > 0, 1− βF0(θ
1)− (1− β)F1(θ1) > 0,
σ(1−δ−σ)
λ+δ−σλ > 0 and 0 <
1−ψ1(θ1)
q1
< 1, which implies that the conditional probability is
decreasing in n. That is to say, a high-educated worker with higher human capital is
more likely to have a higher pay rate.
Specially, when n = 0, Eq.(34) can be written as∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|1)dθ = βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1).
For the new entrants with high-education, their pay rates are randomly drawn from
βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1). When n→∞,∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|∞)dθ =
σ(1− δ − σ)
[
βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)
]
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (λ+ δ) [1− βF0(θ1))− (1− β)F1(θ1))]
,





Proposition 4.2. The probability of the high-educated workers’ equilibrium pay rate
which is less than θ1 conditional on human capital h,
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ, is decreasing in h.
4.3. Comparative analysis
We compare the effect of the low-educated workers’ tenure m on conditional probability∫ θ0
θ0r










G1(θ|1)dθ = βF0(θ′) + (1− β)F1(θ′).
Since
F0(θ′) ≥ βF0(θ′) + (1− β)F1(θ′),






which indicates that for the new entrants, the high-educated workers have relatively




[1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(θ′))] (βλ+ δ − βλσ)

















From Eqs.(33) and (34), we can get that with the increase of tenure, the conditional
probability of the high-educated workers falls faster than that of the low-educated work-
ers which presents that with same tenure, the high-educated workers are more likely to
own higher pay rates.
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5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we perform a numerical example in a more general situation of the model,
so as to show how the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to the low-educated
workers π00, the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to the high-educated
workers π01, the total profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs π0, the profit of the
firms offering the skilled jobs π1 and the supports of the pay rate change with respect
to the proportion of the low-educated workers. Following Burdett [5] who considered
a year as the reference time unit and assume workers have a 40 year expected working
lifetime, we set δ = 0.025. Following Jolivet et al. [15] who estimated American turnover
parameters, we set σ = 0.055 and λ = 0.15. The 3-year panel of individual worker data
are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the analysis of the U.S. labor
market in the 1990s. In addition, we set β = 0.727,1 which represents the proportion of
unskilled jobs in the U.S. labor market [12, 16].
In the numerical example, we group over 500 separate occupations in the census
into two main categories based on the job description and the average educational at-
tainment2. Skilled jobs include includes lawyers, physicians, managers, accountants,
engineers, social workers and teachers. And unskilled jobs include waiters, salesper-
sons, cashiers, construction laborers, automotive mechanics and drivers. In addition,
we interpret low-education as the average education is below 12 years, and interpret
high-education as some college, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, professional degree
and doctorate degree. By solving the market equilibrium3, we investigate the effects of
human capital on market profit in the United States.
From Table 1 and Figure 4, it is apparent that π00 is increasing along with the
proportion of low-educated workers α, while π01 is decreasing with the proportion. In
the real life, the firms offering unskilled jobs are more easily to employ the low-educated
workers and more hardly to find the high-educated workers and that is why π00 is
increasing with α, while π01 is decreasing. In addition, π01 is greater than π00 if α < 0.65
and π00 is greater than π01 if α ≥ 0.65 which indicate that the profit of the firms offering
the unskilled jobs to the high-educated workers is greater than that of offering the
unskilled jobs to the low-educated workers when there are more high-educated workers
as it is more easy to employ the high-educated workers to gain more profit. Further, π0
decreases with α if α ≤ 0.77, while π0 increases with α if α > 0.77 as in this situation
there are many low-educated workers and the profit of the firms offering the unskilled
job to the low-educated workers is very large so that the total profit of the firms offering
the unskilled job increases with the proportion of the low-educated workers.
1Mattoo et al. [16] investigated the occupational placement of immigrants in the U.S. labor market
using the 1990s census data. The data extract from the Census samples were made through IPUMS
(www.ipums.org).
2Educational attainments were obtained by computing the average years of education in each pro-
fession, with all US-born and foreignborn people (males and females) included.
3The numerical results are computed by applying the Matlab 7.10.0.499. The information on CPU
and memory of computer are AMD A6-3420M APU with Radeon(tm) HD Graphics 1.5 GHz and 4.00
GB, respectively. The average running time of the computations is 4.3601× 10−4 seconds.
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(a) The effects of α on π00 and π01




















(b) The effects of α on π0 and π1
Fig. 4. The influence tendency of different proportion of
low-educated workers.





0.05 0.0088 10.1829 10.1917 10.7220 [0.3, 0.9580] [0.7047, 0.9608]
0.10 0.0353 9.1379 9.1732 10.1542 [0.3, 0.9376] [0.7048, 0.9608]
0.15 0.0794 8.1484 8.2278 9.5869 [0.3, 0.9364] [0.7049, 0.9609]
0.20 0.1411 7.2144 7.3555 9.0168 [0.3, 0.9356] [0.7051, 0.9609]
0.25 0.2204 6.3361 6.5565 8.4475 [0.3, 0.9360] [0.7053, 0.9609]
0.30 0.3170 5.5136 5.8306 7.8763 [0.3, 0.9361] [0.7056, 0.9610]
0.35 0.4309 4.7471 5.1780 7.3038 [0.3, 0.9363] [0.7060, 0.9610]
0.40 0.5617 4.0368 4.5985 6.7282 [0.3, 0.9364] [0.7066, 0.9611]
0.45 0.7089 3.3833 4.0922 6.1507 [0.3, 0.9365] [0.7074, 0.9612]
0.50 0.8722 2.7868 3.6590 5.5724 [0.3, 0.9367] [0.7084, 0.9613]
0.55 1.0510 2.2481 3.2991 4.9946 [0.3, 0.9370] [0.7096, 0.9615]
0.60 1.2448 1.7675 3.0123 4.4182 [0.3, 0.9373] [0.7110, 0.9617]
0.65 1.4528 1.3459 2.7987 3.8445 [0.3, 0.9377] [0.7126, 0.9619]
0.70 1.6755 0.9828 2.6583 3.2770 [0.3, 0.9380] [0.7142, 0.9621]
0.75 1.9120 0.6790 2.5910 2.7146 [0.3, 0.9384] [0.7159, 0.9623]
0.80 2.1647 0.4323 2.5970 2.1609 [0.3, 0.9387] [0.7173, 0.9625]
0.85 2.4342 0.2419 2.6761 1.6144 [0.3, 0.9389] [0.7184, 0.9627]
0.90 2.7213 0.1071 2.8284 1.0732 [0.3, 0.9391] [0.7192, 0.9628]
0.95 3.0266 0.0273 3.0539 0.5356 [0.3, 0.9392] [0.7197, 0.9628]
Tab. 1. The effects of different proportion of the low-educated workers.
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For the skilled jobs, the profit decreases with the increasing number of the low-
educated workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is greater
than that of the firms offering the unskilled jobs until there is only a few of high-
educated workers. This implies that the profit of firms offering the skilled jobs increases
with the increasing number of the high-educated workers in the United States, and
profit dispersion between the skilled jobs and the unskilled jobs reaches its maximum
when the proportion of low-educated workers is approximately from 35% to 50%. In the
real life, the labor market in the United States has seen a substantial increase in profit
dispersion since the early 1990s [12]. From the US Census [16], the proportion of low-
educated workers is 47.5% in the 1990s. Therefore, we find that our equilibrium search
model fits the data well. Given θ0, with the decreasing number of the high-educated




. That is, along
with the number of the high-educated workers decreasing, the reservation pay rate of
the high-educated workers increases.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct and analyze an equilibrium search model in a labor market
where firms post wage-human capital contracts and risk neutral workers search for better
job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. There are heterogeneous firms
(unskilled or skilled) and workers (low-educated or high-educated), and high-educated
workers may accept unskilled jobs for which they are over-qualified. In addition, the
structure proportion of the offered jobs affects the equilibrium, which shows there exists
a threshold that can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separating or cross-skill. The
cross-skill equilibrium solution implies the workers with higher human capital are more
likely to earn higher pay rates and that the high-educated workers are more likely to
own higher pay rates than the low-educated workers with the same tenure are likely to.
Numerical simulations show the profit of the firms offering unskilled jobs to low-
educated workers is increasing with the proportion of low-educated workers, while the
profit of the firms offering unskilled jobs to high-educated workers is decreasing with
the proportion. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to the high-
educated workers is greater than the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to
the low-educated workers when there are more high-educated workers. The total profit
of the firms offering the unskilled jobs decrease with the increasing number of the low-
educated workers until the great majority of workers are low-educated worker. The profit
of the firms offering skilled jobs decreases with the increasing number of the low-educated
workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is greater than the
profit of offering the unskilled jobs until there is only very few high-educated workers.
Along with the number of the high-educated workers decreasing, the reservation pay
rate of the high-educated workers increases. One of the most interesting conclusions
is the growth rate of human capital is an endogenous variable which is determined by
death shock, job destruction shock, the fraction of the unskilled jobs and the arrival rate
of jobs.
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APPENDIX
P r o o f of Proposition 2.1. It is obvious that a worker’s income, whether the worker is
unemployed or employed, is always proportional to ht, that is, there exists a number vu0
and a function v0(θt) such that Vu0(ht) = vu0ht and V0(θt;ht) = v0(θt)ht, respectively.
In this way, Eq.(1) can be written as













Since θ0r is the reservation pay rate per unit of human capital of the unemployed
workers with low-education, there is no difference between accepting the offer θ0r and
keeping unemployment, i. e., V0(θ0r ;ht) = Vu0(ht). Therefore, we get v0(θ
0
r) = vu0. Let
θt = θ0r in Eq.(36). Thus,
vu0 = θ0r + (1 + g)
[












by (35), and then (37) can be written as
gvu0 = b(1 + g)− θ0r . (38)





1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θt))
. (39)
Therefore, Eq.(35) can be written as

















1− (1 + g)(1− ψ0(θ))
dθ (by(39))
(40)
Substituting (38) into (40) yields Eq.(3). Moreover, the optimal job search implies that
any unemployed worker with low-education accepts job offer θ0 if and only if θ0 ≥ θ0r .
This completes the proof.
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P r o o f of Proposition 2.2. Calculating the derivative of Eq.(3) with θ0r , so as to get
F0(θ0r) = 1−
δ[1− (1 + g)(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(g − δ − gδ)
. (41)
All the unskilled jobs offer θ0 ≥ θ0r , θ0 ∈ [θ
0, θ
0
], otherwise there is no worker accepts
the offer. Thus in the market equilibrium, F0(θ0r) = 0, and from Eq.(41), we obtain
g =
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
. (42)
Therefore, g is determined by δ, σ, β and λ. It is easily to prove that the partial




















1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))
dθ − gb
δ
+ (1 + g)b.
Let





1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))
dθ − gb
δ
+ (1 + g)b.
∀x1, x2 ∈ [θ0, θ
0
],





1− (1 + g) (1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(θ)))
dθ
∣∣∣∣ .
∃µ ∈ [x1, x2] ∈ (θ0, θ
0
),
|T (x1)− T (x2)| =
gβλ
δ




δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
,
it is easy to find that
0 < k =
gβλ(1− F0(ε))
δ [1− (1 + g)(1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(ε)))]
< 1.
So that
|T (x1)− T (x2)| < k |x2 − x1| .
By using the contraction mapping principle [1], we can prove that there exists a unique
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P r o o f of Proposition 2.5. Calculating the derivative of Eq.(6) with θ1r , so as to get
βF0(θ1r) + (1− β)F1(θ1r) = 1−
δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ)]
λ(eg − 1− δeg)
. (43)
All the skilled jobs offer θ1 ≥ θ1r , θ1 ∈ [θ
1, θ
1
], otherwise there is no worker accepts the





g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg)
. (44)
For the unskilled jobs, if θ
0 ≥ θ1r which means that the high-educated workers choose








δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
,
it is easy to get
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)




[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ
.
Therefore, when the fraction of the unskilled jobs is greater than β, the high-educated
workers choose either the unskilled job or the skilled job.
If θ
0
< θ1r which implies that the high-educated workers only choose the skilled jobs,
we can get F0(θ1r) = 1, and by Eq.(44), there exists
eg =
(1− β)λ+ δ




δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
,
it is easy to get
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)




[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ
.
When the fraction of the unskilled jobs is no greater than β, the high-educated workers
only choose the skilled jobs. This completes the proof.















(1− β) (1− F1(θ))
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Let














(1− β) (1− F1(θ))





∀x1, x2 ∈ [θ0, θ
0
],
|T (x1)− T (x2)| =
∣∣∣∣ (eg − 1)λδ
[∫ x2
x1




∃µ ∈ [x1, x2] ∈ (θ0, θ
0
),





1− βF0(θ)− (1− β)F1(θ)
1− eg [1− δ − σ − λ+ βF0(θ) + (1− β)F1(θ)]
dθ
=
∣∣∣∣ (eg − 1)λδ
[
(x2 − x1)





δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ − λ)]
|x2 − x1| .
It is easy to find that 0 <
(1− σ)(eg − 1)λ
δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ − λ)]
< 1. By using the contraction




P r o o f of Proposition 3.2. Let h = 1 and θ0 = θ
0












Let h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1 and θ0 = θ
0











G0(θ, (1 + g)m−1)dθ
+γ0N0 ((1 + g)m)βλ,
and using Eq.(15) to substitute out N0(·) yields∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m)dθ = q0
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m−1)dθ,
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where
q0 =
(1− δ − σ)(βλ+ δ)
βλ+ δ − σβλ
< 1.
Therefore, when h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=0,∫ θ0
θ0r




Using Eq.(47) in Eq.(15) obtains





















Then we can get that G0(θ, h) satisfies∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ =
δβλF0(θ0)(βλ+ δ − λσ)












This completes the proof.
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